Taken for a Ride: The Automobile Guest and Assumption of Risk by Pedrick, Willard H.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 22 | Number 1
Symposium: Assumption of Risk
Symposium: Insurance Law
December 1961
Taken for a Ride: The Automobile Guest and
Assumption of Risk
Willard H. Pedrick
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Willard H. Pedrick, Taken for a Ride: The Automobile Guest and Assumption of Risk, 22 La. L. Rev. (1961)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol22/iss1/8
Taken for a Ride:
The Automobile Guest and Assumption
of Risk
Willard H. Pedrick*
If he survives the hospitality of hearth and home the social
guest can always be taken for an automobile ride. Should negli-
gence in the maintenance of the home or in driving perchance
bring injury or death to his friend the law of torts simply
licenses the host to do the same for another friend. Though
social relations surely stand high on the list of interests cherished
by our society, one who ventures forth in response to an invita-
tion to visit the home or to ride in the car commonly steps out-
side the protection of the conventional duty of care. Why the
law should deal so meanly with the interest in social relations
as regards protection from physical injury is an interesting
and curious chapter in the history of an interesting and curious
institution. With respect to the premises perhaps a distinction
could be rationalized between the condition of land, to be taken
by the guest as he found it, as compared with activity on the
part of the host generating new hazards after his guest's ar-
rival.' Even as respects real property such a distinction be-
comes shadowy and has little to commend it. As regards vehicles
and their use, it strikes a strange note.2
Perhaps, as has been said, the doctrines of the common law
and the legislation in this area do express a philosophy of rugged
*Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. The duty of care with respect to activity on the premises runs even to those
who are on the premises without invitation by the landowner - trespassers. RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS § 337 (1934) ; PROSSRa, TORTS 435-437 (2d ed. 1955) ; HAR-
PER AND JAMES, TORTS § 27.10 (1956).
A good short statement of this principle will be found in the opinion by Den-
ning, L. J., now Lord Denning, in Slater v. Clay Cross Co. Ltd., (1956) 2 A.E.R.
625.
2. See O'Shea v. Lavoy, 175 Wis. 456, 185 N.W. 525 (1921), analogizing the
liability of the driver towards his guest to that of the landowner and exempting
the driver on the ground that though he knew of the defect in the machine it was
not in the nature of a trap. Cf. Higgins v. Mason, 255 N.Y. 104, 174 N.E. 77
(1930) (broken spindle pin-guest takes the car as he finds it).
There are, it must be admitted, some modern cases sounding this same old
discordant note. See Lippman v. Ostrum, 22 N.J. 14, 123 A.2d 230 (1956) (no
affirmative duty owed to a licensee who solicits a ride).
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individualism but at the least the context of social relationships
is an odd area for the expression of individualism. Whatever the
rationalization, and satisfaction in this area is not likely to be
achieved, it is clear that the host has been accorded an impres-
sive array of defensive weapons to afford protection from lia-
bility for negligently inflicted hurts to his guests. The plight of
the automobile guest is illustrative.
When the guest sued his driver for personal injuries result-
ing from careless driving, in the early days, the defense of con-
tributory negligence was occasionally successful.3  Particularly
in those few jurisdictions where the burden of proof on the
contributory negligence issue is on the plaintiff the defense
succeeded on more than a few occasions. 4 With the increase in
highway speeds and mounting skepticism concerning the ef-
ficacy of "back-seat driving," however, contributory negligence
in many jurisdictions has ceased to be a really productive de-
fense in the commonplace guest-driver personal injury action. 5
At best the issue is put to the jury for resolution and save in
extreme cases juries do not seem disposed to require passengers
to do the driving. But the defendant has other strings to his
bow.
At an early stage in automobile litigation and at a time when
automobile insurance companies were concerned with limiting
their function as far as possible a strange alliance between in-
surers and farm groups secured passage in a large number of
states of the "automobile guest statutes."6 These statutes result-
3. The cases are collected in the A.L.R. notes: 18 A.L.R. 309, 22 A.L.R.
1294; 41 A.L.R. 767; 63 A.L.R. 1432; 47 A.L.R. 293; 90 A.L.R. 984. These
rather ancient annotations dramatize the flow and ebb of the contributory neg-
ligence defense in the guest cases.
4. In a few states, Illinois and Iowa among them, the burden of proving free-
dom from contributory negligence is on the plaintiff. See Green, Illinois Neg-
ligence Law II, 39 ILL. L. REv. 116, 125-130; James, Contributory Negligence, 62
YALE L.J. 691, 729-731 (1953). In such states in the case of a railroad crossing
crash it may be difficult to establish that the guest was in fact maintaining a
lookout, etc. just prior to the crash. By way of example see Wheat v. Baltimore
and Ohio R.R., 262 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1959) (applies Illinois law and judgment
for defendant as matter of law-affirmed).
5. See the ALR notes cited in note 3 above and the more modern decisions
in the Note, 42 A.L.R. 2d 350. See Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contributory
Negligence, 1 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1946) ; Note, Duty of Auto Passenger to Exercise
Care, 37 N.D.L. REV. 282 (1961). The decision of the Michigan Supreme Court
in Yarabek v. Brown, 357 Mich. 120, 97 N.W. 2d 797 (1959), noted 10 DRAKE
L. REV. 141 (1960), contains some pointed observations on the desirability of
de-activating the passenger as a co-pilot or "back-seat driver" and points to the
change in power and speed of the automobile as the reason for the reduced re-
sponsibility of the passenger. See also WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBU-
TORY NEGLIGENCE 596(6) (1951).
6. Tipton, The Florida Automobile Guest Law Today, 27 INS. COUNS. L.J.
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ing from hitchhiker suits against uninsured or underinsured
drivers and intra-family suits against insured defendants were
aimed at relieving the driver (and his insurer) from liability
save for the most horrendous performances at the wheel. Com-
monly phrased in terms of a requirement that the guest estab-
lish that the driver was "wilful," "wanton," "grossly negligent,"
or even "wilfully negligent" as a prerequisite to recovery by the
guest,7 these statutes do in fact represent a formidable obstacle
to recovery by the guest.
It is a tribute to the lobby system of legislation that in this
country a surgeon operating on a charity patient is bound to
exercise ordinary care8 but is permitted, should he drive his
patient home from the hospital, to abandon that standard and
be subjected to liability only on proof of gross negligence or
wilful and wanton misconduct.
THE ROLE OF VOLENTI IN THE GUEST CASES
Notwithstanding the guest statutes, however, there are oc-
casions when the plaintiff may be able to point to excessive
speed, to deliberate chance taking, or to drunken driving as
establishing such gross negligence or wanton misconduct as to
satisfy the requirements of the statute. In such cases both in
states with guest statutes and those without, the defense of
ordinary contributory negligence is likely to be unavailing.
Wanton misconduct or even gross negligence sounds like con-
duct of a different type or kind from ordinary negligence. Hence
as it is commonly stated, ordinary contributory negligence is
223 (1960) (digesting 30 state laws and offering a short commentary). See
Notes, 1 Wyo. L.J. 182 (1947) and 3 Wyo. L.J. 225 (1949), also collecting and
classifying the statutes.
Tipton, The Florida Automobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 287 (1958),
reviews the history of guest statute adoption over the country. The Tipton article
reports that 27 states have guest statutes and that all were adopted in the period
1927-1939. For other accounts see Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 U. CIN. L. REV. 24
(1937); Comments, 35 MARQ. L. REV. 390 (1952); 55 MicH. L. REV. 1197
(1957).
7. Typical of the statutes are those of Illinois requiring "wilful and wanton
misconduct," ILL. REV. STATS. ch. 95Y2, § 9-201 (1959) ; Texas requiring an "in-
tentional [accident] . . . or heedlessness or reckless disregard of the rights of
others" TEXAS CIVIL STATS. art. 6701b (Vernon 1960) ; and Michigan requiring
"gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct" MIcH. STATS. ANN. art.
9.2101 (1948). In Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936) a guest
statute relieving the driver from liability save for intentional infliction of injuries
was sustained as constitutional. For the struggles of a court to make sense of the
term "wilful negligence" see Sorrel v. White, 103 Vt. 277, 153 Atl. 359 (1931).
8. See Gregory, Gratuitous Undertakings and the Duty of Care, 1 DE PAUL L.
REV. 30 (1951) ; McNeice and Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YAlE L.J.
1272 (1949) ; 2 HARPER AND JAmES, TORTS 1045 (1956).
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no bar to an action based on wilful or wanton misconduct.9
Accordingly in such cases the defense is likely to rely on an
ancient and generally disreputable doctrine of the common law
known as the "assumption of risk,"'10 often referred to with its
Latin maxim title volenti non fit injuria. The doctrine, as in-
voked in such cases, argues that the guest cannot recover despite
outrageous misconduct by the driver for the reason that the
guest had, with knowledge of the risk, expressly or impliedly
agreed to "take his chances" and not to claim against the driver
for any resulting injuries. Requisites for application of the doc-
trine are said to be a risk or condition of hazard, awareness of
the risk by the passenger and consent to that risk."
Examination of the automobile guest cases of the past decade
as reflected in appellate court decisions 12 confirms that the as-
sumption of risk defense is very much a factor in one common
type of guest-driver personal injury action. There are a scatter-
ing of cases in which the weather or condition of the highway
was especially adverse and where with respect to the resulting
9. 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS § 22.6 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS 289-290 (2d
ed. 1955) ; Note, 44 A.L.R.2d 1342. It must be recognized that in a few states
ordinary contributory negligence is recognized as a defense to an action under a
guest statute.
Further, in most states contributory gross negligence can be a defense to a
claim based on gross negligence. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 503 (1934).
10. In a considered condemnation of the assumption of risk doctrine, 2 HAR-
PER AND JAMES, TORTS § 21.8 (1956) conclude that: "Except for express assump-
tion of risk, therefore, the term and the concept should be abolished. It adds noth-
ing to modern law except confusion."
Commenting on the doctrine in the English law, Professor STREET, TORTS
173 (1955) notes that: "It is a significant thing that this defense is rarely pleaded
in modern cases . . . . it is difficult to resist the conclusion that assumption of
risk (except in the rare case where there is express consent) is no longer an
important defense in the tort of negligence. Counsel seem to have little confidence
in it, and the courts (especially because of the power to apportion) will, when-
ever possible, treat contributory negligence as the only available defense. . . .No
such post 1945 English case based on negligence has been traced where the plain-
tiff failed solely because of this defense; indeed it might be difficult to find one
in this century."
11. Characteristic is statement from Schinke v. Hartford Accident and Indem-
nity Co., 10 Wis.2d 251, 103 N.W. 2d 73, 74 (1960) : "In order that a guest can
be held to have assumed the risk of the host's negligence the evidence must estab-
lish these three factors: (1) a hazard or danger inconsistent with the safety of
the guest; (2) knowledge and appreciation of the hazard by the guest; and (3)
acquiescence or a willingness to proceed in the face of danger."
12. This study proceeded on a quite unscientific basis and consisted of an
examination of the volumes for the past 10 years of Automobile Cases published
by CCH. The publisher states this special reporter includes the texts "of all
automobile negligence decisions of the state high courts and of the federal appellate
courts, together with comprehensive digests of leading automobile negligence cases
from state intermediate and federal district courts." If the special series does not
cover all it surely covers most of the automobile cases. From scanning the guest
cases contained in these reports the writer has arrived at the prejudices reflected
in the text.
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crash the driver has argued, occasionally with success, that the
guest had assumed the risk.'3 There are a few cases as well
where the defense has been invoked with respect to the unskilled
or handicapped driver.14 Even more rare in modern cases is the
defense when the crash is attributable to some defect in the con-
dition of the machine. 15
The single area where the assumption of risk defense is used
effectively and in an apparent volume of cases is the drinking
party auto crash case.'6 In the drinking party setting the guest
has participated as a drinking companion, perhaps as a pace
setter or at the minimum has knowledge that the driver is under-
taking to mix alcohol and gasoline. One group of cases involves
a group of young (or young in heart) men who wind up in what
too often is a very serious auto wreck. Another group of cases
involves the young woman whose "boy friend" persists in drink-
ing and in driving. Many of the cases produce quite colorful
records.
Notable is a 1958 Wisconsin decision, Ven Rooy v. Farmers
Mutual Insurance Co.,' 7 where there is recounted the story of a
13. Many of the cases concerned with situations where vision has been ob-
scured by fog, snow, rain or sleet are collected in a Note, 42 A.L.R. 2d 350. See
also Le Mere v. Le Mere, 6 Wis.2d 58, 94 N.W.2d 166 (1959) (condition of road
might support an assumption of risk defense) ; Kelly v. Checker White Cab Co.,
131 W. Va. 816, 50 S.E.2d 888 (1948) (snow and ice on road -guest assumed
the risk despite much cautioning of driver). But cf. Geller v. Geller, 314 Ky. 291,
234 S.W.2d 974 (1950) (wet, slick road - not ruled an unusual hazard and not a
case for assumption of risk doctrine).
14. The cases are collected in a Note, 43 A.L.R.2d 1163. The Wisconsin cases
have gone rather far in holding that the guest takes the driver as he is with re-
spect to driving skill. For example, see Eisenhut v. Eisenhut, 212 Wis. 467, 248
N.W. 440 (1933). Cf. Esernia v. Overland Moving Co., 115 Utah 519, 206 P.2d
621 (1949) (hitchhiker knew driver was sleepy yet failed to stay awake to keep
driver from falling asleep -plaintiff defeated by contributory negligence).
15. The cases are collected in Note, 138 A.L.R. 838 (1942). See also Mitchell
v. Heaton, 231 Iowa 269, 1 N.W.2d 284 (1941) (defective wheel bolts held as-
sumption of risk by passenger who knew of condition) ; Higgins v. Mason, 255
N.Y. 104, 174 N.E. 77 (1930) (defective spindle--guest takes the car as he finds
it) ; Lippman v. Ostrum, 22 N.J. 14, 123 A.2d 230 (1956) (guest takes car as
it is complete with bad tire). Cf. Woodward v. Tillman, 82 So.2d 121 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1955) (guest present when brakes locked first time did not assume risk
as to locking of brakes several hours later).
16. In Baird v. Cornelius, 12 Wis.2d 284, 107 N.W.2d 278 (1961), the major-
ity refers to the "drinking party cases" citing three Wisconsin cases as illustra-
tive. For other illustrations see Waltanen v. Wiitala, 361 Mich. 504, 105 N.W.2d
400 (1960) ; McAllister v. Travelers Insurance Co., 121 So.2d 283 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1960) (handled as a contributory negligence case). Many of the cases are
collected in the Note, 15 A.L.R.2d 1165. An unscientific impression from reading
a decade of guest assumption of risk cases is that half or more of all these cases
involved drinking drivers and a high percentage of the plaintiffs had joined in
the fun.
17. 5 Wis.2d 374, 92 N.W.2d 771 (1958).
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youthful group of four teenagers and one young man of twenty-
one out on a round of tavern and dancehall visitations. After all
hands had a number of beers and were merrily speeding down
the highway at about 65 miles per hour with the teenagers sing-
ing "Sparrow in the Treetop" while the twenty-one year old
driver registered his independence with "Bury me not on the
Lone Prairie" the inevitable happened. In the resulting suit by
a teenage brother of the driver brought, under Wisconsin prac-
tice, directly against the insurer, a jury finding that the pas-
sengers had assumed the risk was the basis for affirming the
trial court judgment in favor of the defendant.
There has been an impressive degree of agreement among
the various states on the proper disposition of such cases. A
few states are not sympathetic to the doctrine, preferring to
assimilate the entire subject of delinquent plaintiffs to the de-
fense of contributory negligence.' 8 An early trial court decision
in the United Kingdom expressed hostility towards the assump-
tion of risk defense in the drinking party setting, 19 but higher
court decisions in Commonwealth courts20 and intimations from
later British cases 2' all indicate that the defense is available in
such cases. In most of the states in this country that have con-
sidered the matter the defense of assumption of risk in such
cases is recognized and applied in the drinking party cases.22
18. Perry v. Schmidt, 184 Kan. 758, 339 P.2d 36 (1959) (not disposed to intro-
duce the assumption of risk doctrine into the automobile guest cases) ; Hubenette
v. Ostby, 213 Minn. 349, 350, 6 N.W.2d 637, 638 (1942) ; Landrum v. Roddy, 143
Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1943). See Miller v. Decker, (1957) S.C.R. 624, 9
D.L.R.2d 1, 9, for a strong statement in dissent to the effect that volenti is not
usually the appropriate defense in the drinking party cases. Cf. Schiller v. Rice,
151 Tex. 116, 246 S.W.2d 607 (1952) (assumption of risk is not available in
guest cases but the volenti doctrine can be used defensively in such cases!).
19. Dann v. Hamilton, (1939) 1 K.B. 509.
20. Insurance Commissioner v. Joyce, 77 Comm. L. Repts. 39 (1948); Rog-
genkamp v. Bennett, 80 Comm. L. Repts. 292 (1950) ; Millar v. Decker (1957)
S.C. Gent-Diver v. Neville, (1953) Q.S.R. 1.
21. Although Denning, L.J., in Slater v. Clay Cross Ltd., (1956) 2 A.E.R.
625 approves of Dann v. Hamilton, which some had thought held the defense of
volenti unavailable in the drinking driver cases, his approval was grounded on
the fact that he regarded it as a case properly handled under the contributory neg-
ligence defense. In Davies v. Jones (1958), a plaintiff guest's recovery was re-
duced in the court of appeals by agreement on the assumption that the rule in
Dann v. Hamilton was not too secure a 'base on which to support the plaintiff's
recovery. See 28 HALsBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND, Negligence, p. 84, n.d. (3d ed.
1959).
22. See Rice, The Automobile Guest and the Rationale of Assumption of Risk,
27 MINN. L. REV. 323, 349-350, 447 (1943) ; PRossER, TORTS 304 (2d ed. 1955).
Note, 15 A.L.R. 2d 1165. For typical drinking-driver-risk-assuming guest cases
see Young v. Wheby, 126 W. Va. 741, 30 S.E.2d 6 (1944) ; Waltanen v. Wiitala,
361 Mich. 504, 105 N.W.2d 400 (1960) ; Severson v. Hauck, 11 Wis.2d 192, 105
N.W.2d 369 (1960).
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There are, of course, evidentiary problems and one finds a
considerable difference from state to state on the critical ques-
tion whether the issue is to be put to the jury or whether the
court may rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs did know
and did accept the risk in riding with the defendant.23 There are
in addition certain technical escapes from the doctrine applied
on occasion. If it can be said that the cause of the accident was
not the general risk in riding with an intoxicated driver but some
later failure on his part even to exercise that care that might
be expected under the circumstances then a recovery for the
plaintiffs may be rationalized even though they assumed some
risk - not this one. 24 There is as well an interesting disagree-
ment among the courts on the significance of the fact that the
plaintiff may have been so insensible at the time of decision
as not to have been able to contract. Here some courts allow the
plaintiff to escape the asumption of risk defense while others
take the position that a self-induced deficiency cannot excuse
him.25 Nevertheless, with very few discordant notes the defense
generally is recognized and applied to defeat personal injury
actions brought by those who with knowledge of the fact accept
an invitation to ride with a drinking or drunken driver.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Is it a good thing to bar from suit injured passengers who
ride with the driver knowing, perhaps from participation, that
he is "under the influence"? Before offering a judgment on that
question, largely neglected in the cases, it may be appropriate
23. Cox v. Johnston, 139 Colo. 376, 339 P.2d 989 (1959) (assumption of risk
defense is for the jury) ; Turner v. Johnson, 333 S.W.2d 749 (Ky. 1960) (sim-
ilar); Quisenberry v. Herman, 243 F.2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (assumption of
risk instruction to jury proper on facts); Verdino v. Hayes, 201 N.Y.S.2d 853
(1960) (both parties drunk but not assumption of risk as a matter of law);
Cousins v. Cooper, 339 S.W.2d 316 (Ark. 1960) (assumption of risk is generally
for the jury). But cf. Waltanen v. Wiitala, 361 Mich. 504, 105 N.W.2d 400
(1960) (assumption of risk as a matter of law). Boureston v. Boureston, 231
Wis. 666, 285 N.W. 426 (1939) (similar). The cases are collected in Note, 15
A.L.R.2d 1165.
24. By way of illustration see Hatcher v. Daniel. 227 Miss. 862, 87 So.2d 90
(1956) (fishing camp road but guest did not assume risk that driver would not
keep adequate lookout) ; Le Mere v. Le Mere, 6 Wis.2d 58, 94 N.W.2d 166 (1959)
(similar) ; Gent-Diver v. Neville, (1953) Q.S.R. 1 (bad light risk accepted but
not risk of driving on wrong side of road).
25. McAllister v. Travelers Insurance Co., 121 So.2d 283 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1960) (to allow a guest to plead intoxication to escape the assumption of risk
and contributory negligence doctrines would "be tantamount to placing a premium
on moral turpitude." Cf. dissenting opinion in Miillar v. Decker, (1957) S.C.R.
624, 9 D.L.R.2d 1 arguing that after the drinking party had progressed a bit the
plaintiff was in no condition to contract away a claim.
[Vol. XXII
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to consider certain changes in negligence law and its setting
that considerably affect the modern automobile accident case.
First there is the matter of the abandonment of contributory
negligence as a complete defense in the United Kingdom, the
states of Australia, the provinces of Canada, and a number of
the states of this country.
26
By the terms of the British Contributory Negligence Act of
194527 the "fault of the person suffering the damage" shall not
defeat his action but shall be a ground for reducing his recover-
able damages. The American statutes are aimed at the same
objective though sometimes phrased more directly in terms of
contributory negligence. The general idea accurately imple-
mented by the language of the British act is to permit plain-
plaintiff to escape the assumption of risk defense while others
tiffs to recover from negligent defendants despite contributory
fault on their part. The precise basis or standard on which dam-
ages recoverable are to be reduced on account of the plaintiff's
fault verges on the mysterious.2 8 There is some talk in British
26. The statutes are reviewed in Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH.
L. REV. 465 (1953), Maloney, From Contributory Negligence to Comparative
Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 135 (1958). See also
WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ch. 10 (1951). The Mis-
sissippi act has been described as a model of "brevity and simplicity." The Wis-
consin statute only permits the plaintiff to recover if the plaintiff's negligence
was less than that of the defendant. The Nebraska statute allows a plaintiff to
recover whose negligence is slight in relation to the gross negligence of the defend-
ant. 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 1238 (1956). For descriptions of other statutes
in Georgia, Arkansas, Tennessee and South Dakota see Peck, Comparative Neg-
ligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MICH. L. REV. 689 (1960).
27. The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 and 9 Geo. VI,
c. 28. By Section 4 of the act the term "fault" on the part of the plaintiff is
defined to mean "contributory negligence."
28. In the British Act it is provided that the reduction in the plaintiff's re-
coverable damages shall be "to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable
having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damage." Ex-
pounding on the meaning of this language, Denning, L.J., now Lord Denning, in
Davies v. Swan Motor Co., (1949) 2 K.B. 291, at 326, said that "The amount of
the reduction . . . involves a consideration, not only of the causative potency of
a particular factor, but also of its blameworthiness."
This kind of language gives little guidance and after discussing the matter at
some length, Professor Glanville WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE 484 (1951) concludes that it is not possible for an appellate court to
lay down any "general principles to govern the exercise of the discretion other
than the principle that the discretion must be exercised 'judicially'."
It must be conceded that the statutes are not drafted in a very definitive fash-
ion. The British statute speaks about the plaintiff's share of "responsibility for the
damage" which does sound like a command to weigh each of two or more causes
and arrive at some quantitative conclusion. The Wisconsin statute speaks of
diminishing the plaintiff's recovery "in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering." The Mississippi statute approved by Har-
per and James talks in terms of diminishing the plaintiff's recovery in proportion
to the "amount of negligence" attributable to the plaintiff.
To determine the percentage contribution of one cause as against another in
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cases about the "causative potency" of the plaintiff's negligence
as compared with that of the defendant.29 As if anyone could
think sensibly with these words racing round his head! The most
sensible suggestion for a guide line in reducing the plaintiff's
recovery on account of his contributory fault takes into account
the judicially ignored fact of life in accident litigation -the
presence of liability insurance. The suggestion is that the appor-
tionment of damages on account of the plaintiff's contributory
negligence ought to be regarded as in the nature of a fine im-
posed on the plaintiff and assessed accordingly.30 This approach
rests on the assumption that normally damages not recoverable
by the plaintiff will in fact be borne by him personally. What-
ever the criterion for apportioning damages, however, the legis-
lature in those jurisdictions where comparative negligence has
been adopted has made plain its desire that plaintiffs not be
barred from recovery because of their contributory fault.
In the face of this legislative prescription it would be a shock-
ing thing if one class of cases were singled out by the courts as
ineligible for this damage apportionment treatment. That, how-
ever, appears to be precisely what has happened! It is said that
the defense of assumption of risk is distinct and apart from the
defense of contributory negligence and accordingly that assump-
tion of risk remains an absolute defense.31 So it is that Wiscon-
sin with its comparative negligence statute up to 1961 produced
perhaps more than half of the appellate court decisions in this
a negligence case seems very much a will of the wisp chase. Similarly, to weigh
the amount of negligence of one party relative to the negligence of another calls
for scales not easily found. It should be recognized that the legislatures were
unable to put into meaningful words any description of the formula to be used
in the apportionment of damages under a comparative negligence statute. Surely
guide lines are desirable if this is a legal system at work. If guide lines there are
to be, they must be supplied by the courts who ought to accept the comparative
negligence statute not as an end of judicial innovation but as a new beginning
assisted by a legislative repudiation of the absolute rule of contributory negligence.
From this point of view the very indefiniteness of the legislation may be a virtue.
29. See the quotation from Denning, L.J., in the preceding note.
30. See Parsons, Negligence, Contributory Negligence and the Man Who Does
not Ride the Bus to Clapham, 1 U. oF MELB. L. REV. 163, 182-192 (1957), de-
veloping this suggestion in persuasive fashion.
31. WINFIELD, TORTS 47 (6th ed. 1954) ; FLEMING, TORTs 232 (1957). Illus-
trating this proposition are the decisions in Severson v. Hauk, 11 Wis.2d 192,
105 N.W.2d 369 (1960) (on a jury finding of assumption of risk and also charg-
ing the plaintiff's contributory negligence with 25% responsibility, the trial judge
entered judgment for the defendant and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirms) ;
Seymour v. Maloney, (1955) 1 D.L.R. 824 (Sup. Ct. of Nova Scotia), (held as-
sumption of risk and complete defense, if contributory negligence; then apportion-
ment on basis of 75% -25% would have been proper). Cf. Marasek v. Condie,
12 D.L.R.2d 252 (Alberta Sup. Ct. 1958) (drinking party case handled on con-
tributory negligence doctrine and passenger was 15% negligent in going on).
[Vol. XXII
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country on the subject of assumption of risk in automobile guest
cases with plaintiffs often barred in the drinking party cases
from any recovery 2
In those relatively rare cases of express assumption of risk
it is proper and fair to state that no duty of care is owed to one
who by contract has dispensed with that duty. But drinking
party cases involving the assumption of risk doctrine do not in-
volve express or contractual assumption of risk -far from it.
In such a setting there is normally no explicit consideration
given to the question whether the passenger will make a claim
in the event of injury. If there were such a conversation and
the question was put to the prospective rider in the context of
the fact that the driver is insured, is it plausible at all that the
parties would agree that no claim would be filed against the
driver's insurer?
To intimate that there is an implicit understanding that no
claim will be made in case of mishap in the drinking party situa-
tion is simply to manhandle or distort the facts. If the parties
addressed themselves to the question, it is much more likely that
the driver would encourage all to be of good cheer on the ground
that he is insured. Similarly to charge the plaintiff with an
agreement to accept a risky driver when the alternative was to
abandon ship at some remote spot simply discounts the duress
that situation and relationships can exert. When the courts deny
plaintiffs any recourse to the courts in such cases, they are not
enforcing any release agreement made by the parties. They are
rather expressing the law's disapproval of the plaintiff's care-
less or foolhardy conduct. In short, on moralistic grounds they
bar the plaintiff on the basis of his participation or involvement
in the defendant's tortious conduct. To recite as do the cases
that assumption of risk means that the defendant has violated
no duty to the plaintiff, making the comparative negligence stat-
utes inapplicable, is simply not persuasive. Whether the situa-
tion is one of "no-duty" or is one where the breach of duty is
subject to a defense is wholly a matter of the internal construc-
tion of judicial opinions. In the face of a legislative prescription
that contributorily negligent plaintiffs are to be permitted to
recover, a withdrawal of the drinking party guest driver cases
from the operation of the apportionment statute grounded on a
distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of
32. Another unscientific leap to a conclusion. Both the CCH automobile cases
and the Note, 15 A.L.R.2d 1165 provide supporting data.
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risk is to draw a distinction too sharp, too attenuated, in these
cases to serve the cause of justice. The mind of a judge ought
not to rest easy with a broad axe dismissal of the drinking party
case while a guest who carelessly diverts his driver's attention
may be permitted to recover.
It may be, as some have argued, that the phrase "assumption
of risk" covers some cases that are often not properly described
as contributory negligence cases.8 3 Assumption of risk connotes
a state or condition of danger whereas negligence or contribu-
tory negligence bespeaks of specific risk creating acts or omis-
sions. But in the context of the drinking party it is surely the
height of unwisdom to debate whether the plaintiff's decision to
remain with the party was contributory negligence or the as-
sumption of risk. The basic consideration is that the plaintiff
has failed adequately to heed the instinct for self preservation.
If the legislature has prescribed that fault or contributory neg-
ligence on the part of the plaintiff is merely to reduce damages,
then old learning to the effect that no duty of care is owed in the
assumption of risk cases ought to be abandoned as having no
relevance to the administration of comparative negligence stat-
utes.
A distinction between assumption of risk and contributory
negligence that made no practical difference before the days of
comparative negligence statutes ought not to become the basis
of a serious practical difference today. On this point the anal-
ysis offered by the older cases is simply not adequate.
It is not without interest in this context that jury verdicts
reported in appellate cases indicate that juries would be inclined
33. The distinction between the assumption of risk and the contributory neg-
ligence defenses is the subject of an elaborate and extended analysis in Rice,
The Automobile Guest and the Rationale of Assumption of Risk, 27 MINN. L. REV.
323, 334-350 (1943). Most emphatic was the statement of the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit in Potter v. Brittan, 286 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1961) to the
effect that scholarly opinion is quite unanimous to the effect that the two doctrines
are quite distinct and never to be confused! But more considered judgments see
the two as overlapping to a considerable extent. PRossEa, TORTS 304 (2d ed.
1955) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 466 (1934). See HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 1191
(1956).
If the argument of Professor Glanville Williams (which finds considerable
support in the English cases, to the effect that assumption of risk or the volenti
defense should be limited to those cases in which it is possible to say that the
plaintiff expressly waived his right of legal action, WILLIAMS, JOINT
TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ch. 12 (1951)) should be accepted, then
the area of overlap would be substantially reduced. HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS
1191 (1956) arrive at a similar conclusion to the effect that the assumption of
risk defense should be limited to the situation of the express assumption.
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to take a more lenient view of the non-driver in the drinking
party case, reducing his recoverable damages but not barring
his action. Indeed, some of these cases report jury findings both
that the plaintiff assumed the risk of the driver's drunken driv-
ing and that the plaintiff's negligence was a 25% factor in the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff!34 The previous practice in
Wisconsin and other jurisdictions in such cases has been simply
to enter judgment for the defendant. It is that practice that is
here deplored.
All the more reason then to cheer the 1961 decision of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Baird v. Cornelius.5 Impressed
with a paper prepared for a meeting of the Board of Circuit
Court Judges on the subject of "Contributory Negligence and
Assumption of Risk" and perhaps by other writing on the sub-
ject,36 five members of the court in concurring opinions indicated
they thought the time has come to reconsider the relationship
between the assumption of risk doctrine and contributory neg-
ligence in the context of the automobile guest case. Two mem-
bers of the court in a forthright review of the authorities made
clear their conviction that justice would best be served by as-
similating the assumption of risk doctrine into contributory neg-
ligence defense, subject to their apportionment statute. As the
concurring opinion put it: "A rule of law which makes complete
denial of recovery dependent upon the vigor of a wife's protests
to her husband, or her failure to leave the car many miles from
home, or whether a fifteen year old girl sufficiently protests
against the reckless driving of an intoxicated driver and asks to
be let out of the car, is one which is open to question and ought
to be re-examined. '8 7
It is a heartening vindication of belief in the vitality of the
common law to see a court announcing its determination to re-
examine what has for too long passed without question. It is to
be hoped that the Wisconsin court will shortly effect the assimi-
lation of assumption of risk and contributory negligence in the
automobile guest cases as urged in the concurring opinion in
Baird v. Cornelius and further that other comparative negli-
gence jurisdictions will follow suit.88 This will not mean that the
34. See the cases cited in note 31 supra.
35. 12 Wis.2d 284, 107 N.W.2d 278 (1961), noted 1961 Wis. L. REv. 677.
36. 107 N.W.2d at 285 and see as well Comment, 1960 Wis. L. REv. 460.
37. Id. at 286.
38. Nebraska preceded Wisconsin in assimilating the contributory negligence
defense into the contributory negligence defense subject to a comparative negli-
gence statute. Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1942).
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millenium will have arrived, for there are subsidiary problems
to be dealt with - some of them sticky.89 It will mean that there
is a bit more of reason and consistency in the administration of
justice in the automobile guest cases in states with comparative
negligence statutes.
VOLENTI, THE DRINKING PARTY GUEST, AND PUBLIC POLICY
In those states which do not have apportionment statutes,
and this group is by far the larger, it is not possible to resolve
drinking party, guest-driver accident litigation by suggesting
merely that the apportionment or comparative negligence stat-
utes should be applied in such cases. Even in non-apportion-
ment states it is nevertheless appropriate to inquire whether the
ideal solution to the drinking party case is the dismissal of the
guest's action against the driver on the ground of assumption
of risk or contributory negligence. The matter may be consid-
ered first from the standpoint of policy.
It is difficult to relate to the public interest the going rule
that bars the risk-taking guest from suit against the drinking
driver. If it is thought that locking the courthouse door will
teach the guest a lesson, the student must be recognized as a
slow learner. As concerns the driver it is clear that application
of the assumption of risk defense simply encourages him to
gather up his friends for another unsteady journey. Nor is this
prospect any cause for concern to the only coldly sober intelli-
gence in the picture - that of his insurer. In short, recognition
of the assumption of risk doctrine is not calculated to carry out
any deterrent function for the law of torts in a setting where
deterrence is singularly attractive.
By contrast, if guests suing drivers for traffic injuries from
alcoholic parties were not barred by the assumption of risk de-
39. The commentary on the Baird v. Cornelius decision, Note, 1961 Wis. L.
REV. 677, points out that there will be some vexing problems on the formulation
of proper instructions for the jury on the assumption of risk-contributory neg-
ligence issue. The complications, most acute in the multiple party situation, can
be traced in large part to the apparent necessity under the Wisconsin practice
of basing the apportionment on a finding as to percentage of causation. The
plaintiff's recovery is diminished on the basis of a determination of the extent to
which the plaintiff's contributory negligence has operated as a cause of his injury.
To think along these lines with respect to the risk-assuming passenger, who after
all was only there, does create problems. It would be a happy thing if Wisconsin
would abandon the percentage of cause approach in favor of the "imposition of
fine" rationalization advocated in the text. Though a great amount of water is
already over the dam it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the court might
be willing to re-examine this troublesome matter of the criteria for effecting
diminution in a negligent plaintiff's recovery.
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fense, it is highly unlikely that this would encourage guests to
ride with drinking drivers. Although the driver may be outside
the arena of reasonable communication at the time of his intoxi-
cation, he is likely to be quite sober and reflective at the time he
pays his liability insurance premium. The insurer's concern at
the time the claim is generated and filed might very well be
translated into a message the driver will understand in connec-
tion with his premium payment. Insurance companies have dem-
onstrated in other settings an impressive potential for accident
prevention, 40 and recognition of the assumption of risk defense
in guest driver litigation simply reduces the pressure on the in-
surer to undertake a function of accident deterrence related to
drivers who drink. Some companies presently provide a reduced
premium rate for abstemious drivers. Perhaps rates should be
generally a bit higher for those drivers who admit to occasional
libations. Honesty in response on policy applications could be
encouraged by a provision subjecting the insured in case of dis-
honest response to a heavy penalty, perhaps even an obligation
to indemnify the insurer for any liability causally connected with
the misrepresentation.
41
Apart from the matter of possible deterrence the guest driver
drinking party case in a sense crystallizes the question of whether
the law of torts should limit itself to loss shifting in the pretense
that massive systems of loss distribution are not in operation or
whether the law of torts ought to see itself as an adjunct of the
insurance mechanism with tort rules to be modified where pos-
sible to enlarge on the operation of the insurance - loss distri-
bution principle. If the guest is barred from court on the as-
sumption of risk defense, it is probably fair to say that despite
Blue Cross, wage continuation plans and accident insurance a
substantial part of the guest's damage will fall on the individ-
ual. 42 If the loss is shifted to the driver via court imposed liabil-
40. See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered, The Impact of Liability In-
surance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 559-563; Lemmon, What the Independent Insurance
Companies are Contributing to Traffic Safety and Why, 1956 INs. L.J. 418 (a
short and self-serving statement).
41. It is of some interest to note that in the State of Western Australia in
the case of injury to a third party by a drinking driver the injured party has
recourse against the insurance fund but the fund in turn has recourse against the
driver who was driving while intoxicated. See Parsons, Death and Injury on the
Roads, 3 ANN. L. REV. OF W. AUSTRALIA 201, 222, 291 (1954).
42. REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTO AcCIDENTS
ch. IV (The Columbia Study, 1932) ; James and Law, Compensation for Auto
Accident Victims, 26 CONN. B.J. 70, 77-78 (1952). The Columbia study largely
indicated that those losses not compensated for by liability insurance remained
with the individual. There has been some increase in self insurance through Blue
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ity, however, it will then be distributed through his liability in-
surance over drivers generally, perhaps with differential pre-
miums for all drivers who do not class themselves as teetotalers.
Though loss distribution does seem an inordinately expensive
process, with insurance company costs of selling and administra-
tion using upwards of half of each premium dollar,43 distribution
of the loss sustained will appeal to many as compared with the
alternative of visiting all or a substantial part of the loss on the
individual guest.
Surely on any moral basis the drinking or acquiescent pas-
senger is not to be tarred with a stickier brush than the drinking
driver. From the moral viewpoint all in the party ought to share
the burdens that result from their common course of conduct. If
anything, there is something to be said for the view that the
driver is in a special position. It is his conduct that creates the
risk for himself, for his passengers, and for the traveling public.
Any rule that relieves from responsibility for damage inflicted
as a result of his irresponsible driving should be suspect.
Legislatures have quite generally recognized that the driver
is to be regarded separately from his passengers. It is not an
offense generally to ride as a passenger while in an intoxicated
condition. It is universally an offense against the criminal law
to drive while intoxicated. 44 One may well question whether the
civil side of the court is adequately supporting the legislative
policy in relieving from civil liability a drunken driver on the
ground simply that his passengers assumed the risk. It would
seem more in keeping with the legislation on the subject to deny
the availability of the defense of assumption of risk in the face
of a flat legislative command that no one is to drive while under
the influence and that none can license such conduct.4
Cross, wage continuation plans, and accident insurance; but it is believed that
much of the economic loss from automobile accidents estimated at $6,500,000,000
in 1960 (NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 5 (1961)) still falls on
individuals. Current studies updating the Columbia Report will supply further
information on this point.
43. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 5 (1961), reporting
overhead cost of automobile insurance as $2,500,000,000 as against personal injury
losses from auto accidents of $4,300,000,000. The Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 1961, at p. 560 reports that the losses paid in relation to premiums
paid has varied over the past few years as follows:
1955-45.7
1956-52
1957- 53.9
1958 - 52.7
1959-56.8
44. 5A Am. JUR., Auto Highway Traffic §§ 1156, 1158.
45. It is elementary that the assumption of risk defense is not available when
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Finally, in states with "guest statutes" perhaps the statutory
requirement that the guest establish "wilful or wanton miscon-
duct" or "gross negligence" or even "wilful negligence" is as
much by way of obstacle as the legislature wishes to place in the
path of the litigating guest. Is it fitting to recognize as a separ-
ate defense the assumption of risk doctrine when the driver has
so far departed from the standard of care in his deportment at
the wheel? This approach is in harmony with the view expressed
by many courts denying the availability of ordinary contributory
negligence as a defense in such cases.
46
If a court is willing to re-examine the question of whether
the assumption of risk defense in the context of the drinking
party guest driver lawsuit serves the public interest in our time,
taking into account the existence of liability insurance, the
threat posed by the drinking driver and legislation reflecting
concern about that threat, it should be possible to work out a
system that would deal with the problem more satisfactorily
than the present all or nothing use of the assumption of risk doc-
trine. If in drinking party, guest-driver accident litigation the
assumption of risk defense were to be wholly assimilated into
the contributory negligence defense, this would mean that in all
save extreme cases the defense will simply go to the jury for
final resolution by it. Under such a contributory negligence ap-
proach even in guest statute states gross contributory negligence
should be a defense to gross negligence. Possibly the jury could
be relied upon to temper the plaintiff's recovery in recognition
of the plaintiff's own culpability. Comparative negligence can
operate outside as well as inside the law.
Perhaps it would be better, however, to recognize openly in
drinking party cases that imposition of some sort of penalty on
the risk-taking plaintiff would be socially desirable. Absent a
its use would frustrate the operation of protective legislation. Those intended by
the legislature to be protected against their own weakness are not to be denied the
legislative protection by the assumption of risk defense. RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 483: "Statutes designed to protect plaintiff against Inability to Protect Him-
self." If the defendant's negligence consists in the violation of a statute enacted
to protect a class of persons from their inability to exercise self-protective care,
a member of such class is not barred by his contributory negligence from recovery
for bodily harm caused by the violation of such statute. PROSSER, TORTS 313 (2d
ed.) ; HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 1187 (1956). Cf. Martin v. Greyhound Corp.,
227 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955) (employee and wife supplied with passes that ex-
pressly waived claims against carrier-common carrier can't secure binding
waiver of claims from paying passengers and public policy will not permit waiver
of claim for wilful or wanton negligence even on the part of a gratuitous pas-
senger).
46. See the cases cited in note 9 supra.
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statutory comparative negligence mechanism, one approach,
albeit a bold one, would be for the courts to continue to recognize
the assumption of risk defense but limit its function in light of
the operation of the liability insurance system to that of impos-
ing a penalty or fine on the plaintiff. After all, the assumption
of risk doctrine is only a complete defense because the courts
have made it so. As reason dictates different results in the face
of changed conditions so also can the operation of the assumption
of risk doctrine be revised - by the courts. The assumption of
risk by automobile guests provides a small area in which the
courts could adopt by their own decision a kind of comparative
negligence doctrine attuned to the fact of liability insurance. Be-
cause of the limited nature of the cases - the drinking party
guest driver lawsuit, adoption of this suggestion would not seem
as shocking as a wholesale adoption of the principle of compara-
tive negligence by judicial fiat. Though it is probably not be-
yond the realm of possibility that a court might be disposed on
common sense grounds to follow the suggested course, none will
be surprised if this avenue to wider loss distribution remains
vacant.
If one hazards a guess about the probable future development
of the law in this area over the course of the next decade or so
the forecast will run more in terms of probable increase in sub-
mission of the assumption of risk defense to the jury and its
amelioration in that way rather than by renunciation of the doc-
trine in whole or in part. In harmony with this course of devel-
opment restriction of the defense to litigation between the guest
and his driver will continue. In the guest's suits against a third
party it does not seem proper to charge the guest with assuming
the risk of the negligence of some third party and by and large
the present case-law recognizes the impropriety of the use of the
assumption of risk defense in such cases. The defense of con-
tributory negligence can, of course, be invoked in such cases.
4 7
47. The cases are collected in a series of Notes, 18 A.L.R. 309, 22 A.L.R.
1294, 41 A.L.R. 767, 47 A.L.R. 293, 63 A.L.R. 1432. Representative modern de-
cisions denying the availability of the assumption of risk defense when the guest
sues the other driver are Seal v. Lemmel, 140 Colo. 387, 334 P.2d 694 (1959) ;
Berkstresser v. Voight, 63 N.M. 470, 321 P.2d 1115 (1958). Of interest in this
connection is the recent English decision in Dawrant v. Nutt, (1960) 3 A.E.R.
681, where Stable, J., held that the plaintiff was in breach of duty in riding as
a passenger on an unlighted motorcycle so as to diminish her recovery 25% under
the comparative negligence act. As between the plaintiff's deceased husband and
the other driver, however, the blame was assessed 50-50.
The comparative negligence statutes permits of a more satisfactory handling
of this type of problem. Though the defense of assumption of risk is generally not
available to third party defendants, its cousins, contributory negligence and im-
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Though the undercurrent moving in the direction of wider
loss distribution may be expected to have its effect on the actual
use of the assumption of risk defense in guest driver accident
litigation, it must be recognized that there are some countervail-
ing currents at work. It is surely significant that the one state
in this country yielding by far the greater number of assumption
of risk guest-driver cases has been Wisconsin. Wisconsin has a
comparative negligence statute, allows a direct action against the
insurer, permits suits between family members; the state has
no guest statute and the special verdict practice is customary.
In this setting the courts' previous enthusiasm for the assump-
tion of risk defense perhaps reflected a judicial concern that the
scales have tipped too far in favor of the plaintiff. In some
states the assumption of risk defense may well continue in vogue
until such time as the legislature sees fit to deal drastically with
the problem.
puted negligence through joint enterprise or common control, are available and on
occasion provide a complete defense to the third party.
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